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ABSTRACT 
Critics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have denigrated its 
purpose and scoffed at its principles of consensus and sharing the burdens of defense.  To 
many, it has been flawed from the outset as concerns its American business principles, 
false promise of democracy, and claim to be a basis for durable peace in Europe.  Yet 
NATO may be the most successful security institution in modern history, even as it 
wages war for the second time in a decade.  This study assesses underlying causes for this 
success by examining NATO’s foundation, against the background of war and peace in 
20th century Europe.  Embracing the discipline of history as the ideal method of inquiry 
to discover the essence of this alliance as well as the fundamental issues of democracy 
and collective defense in the 21st century this study contains a thorough examination of 
NATO’s origins and general principles of same for the present. Covering NATO from its  
inception, well before the end of the 1939-1945 war, until the 1949 signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, this work contains  an inventory of historical knowledge to 
provide a comprehensive history of NATO’s formation and a full appreciation of the 
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1. NATO the Organization, Implications for Grand Strategy and Policy 
The story of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might well be the 
tale of those who have denigrated its purpose, and scoffed at its principles of consensus 
and sharing of the burdens of defense.  In the eyes of its many critics, the organization 
has been flawed from the outset as concerns its American business principles, its false 
promise of democracy, and its claim to be something that it manifestly is not in the minds 
of such critics, namely a durable basis for peace in Europe.  Yet NATO has flourished for 
almost sixty years amid its perpetual crises and in spite of its doubters’ endless barrage of 
scorn.  The present study seeks to explain this phenomenon of contradiction through an 
examination of the foundation of the alliance as a means of explicating its core principles 
of values as applied to the methods of collective defense.  In the aftermath of the 1999 
Kosovo operation, certain makers of US military policy decried formal alliances and their 
methods of operation, especially those of achieving consensus.  Such was especially the 
case in the wake of the September 11, 2001 assaults in the initial U.S. riposte at arms.  In 
particular, the critics of the recent past have put forward the unilateralist and tub-
thumping ideal of the mission defining the coalition as a means to short-circuit what the 
critics see as unnecessary constraints on US power. 
a. Contemporary View 
NATO has endured into this century with two rounds of enlargement and 
new peace enforcement and security missions that represent a strategic and diplomatic 
revolution when compared to the tasks of the early 1980s.  Indeed, NATO may well be 
the most successful security institution at promoting peace and economic well-being in 
modern history, even as it wages war for the second time in a decade.  This study 
assesses underlying causes for this curious fact through an examination of NATO’s 
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organization and foundation, set against the background of war and peace in Europe in 
the 20th century.  Other institutions of collective security, specifically the League of 
Nations (LoN) and the United Nations (UN), arose to prevent war in the wake of 
catastrophes, but neither has proven as effective in this regard as NATO.  Here arises the 
question of collective defense versus collective security – why one has succeeded where 
the other failed.  These ideals and the institutions that embody them have undergone an 
important transformation in the modern epoch, a process which is at the basis of security, 
defense, and military policy in the Euro-Atlantic realm. 
The UN has subordinate elements that provide relief and assistance to 
states and people around the world.  However, it does not have sufficient means and 
methods to form a policy of peace enforcement and then execute same with military 
force.  Article 51 of the UN Charter made allowance for regional organizations for 
collective defense, an important clause which has been underappreciated in the 21st 
century.  The Security Council depends on the world’s great powers, which seldom agree 
on matters of the limited application of military force to the ends of collective security, 
granted the conflicts between the members of the Security Council and beyond.  
Subsequent to NATO’s establishment, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was founded with peace in Europe as a priority.  It has now evolved into the European 
Union (EU), but in its stage as the European Economic Community (EEC), and in 
partnership with NATO, it brought prosperity to Western Europe as a fundamental 
element of security there.  European history is rife with conflict and was the battlefield 
for most of both world wars.  There has not been a global war since 1945, but, 
unfortunately, there have been numerous regional conflicts and wars in later years.  Yet, 
none of these has occurred in the area established for the North Atlantic Treaty.  This 
work will explain why this is the case, answering the question:  How did NATO come 
about?  As a historical narrative, it will do so by exploring the reasons for the Treaty, 
incorporating the rationale for its creation, and the way the institution arose from the 
European uncertainty and despair of World War II. 
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b. Levels of Policy as Applied to the Individual 
As a European Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) in the Marine Corps, this 
author expects to be called upon to conduct research and provide insight or 
recommendations that support the decision-making process of senior staff officers, a 
commander, or an ambassador in the execution of U.S. foreign, security and defense 
policy.  This writer’s experience in preparing Marines to serve the United States’ national 
interests in Bosnia  in  1995 and 1996 gave him an awareness that will serve him well as 
a European RAO in two ways.  First, he gained a tremendous appreciation for the value 
of regional expertise.  While he did not become well-versed in the culture or politics of 
former Yugoslavia, he did draw on a wide array of resources and individuals, thereby 
gaining an appreciation for the complexity of the relationships among the inhabitants of 
southeast Europe.  As a RAO, understanding the way political, social and cultural groups 
relate to one another, and the factors that define these relationships, is imperative.  
Second, he became aware from the tactical level onwards of NATO’s role and capability 
relative to other political and social institutions in Europe and beyond.  This 
enlightenment has resulted in his continuing desire to understand the dynamics involved 
in the Euro-Atlantic relationship, and his enrollment in a program through which he can 
explore that subject in great depth.  This thesis emerged from this nexus of personal and 
professional experience.  Amid this combination of field experience, at the very lowest 
level of policy, and the pleasure of advanced study, he has often discovered knowledge of 
factors and events beyond what are typically addressed within the common scope of how 
NATO as an organization works in theory and in fact.  This knowledge has made him 
contemplate the influence of those now remote but nonetheless essential factors and 
events on the statesmen who established the alliance in the 1940s and developed the 
institution in the subsequent decade, and inspired this thesis.  The study that follows 
reflects the attempt by this writer to answer questions about the essence of NATO the 
organization that go beyond the doubts and scorn of the critics of the alliance.  The hope 
is that the higher insight of the statesmen and soldier diplomats who fashioned the 
alliance may have more to say to men and women at arms in the 21st century than certain 
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unilateralist journalists and members of the polarized chattering classes in this country or 
Europe would allow.   
B. IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY FOR SERVING OFFICERS 
1. History 
The present study rests on the premise that the clearest manner to discover the 
essence of the alliance, as well as fundamental issues of democracy and collective 
defense, even in the 21st century, is through an examination its origins and the genesis of 
its operational code in the past.  That is, this study eschews the cult of present-ism found 
in so many other studies written by this writer’s colleagues.  Instead, it embraces the 
discipline of history as the ideal method of inquiry.  An examination of NATO’s 
formation, it covers the alliance from its inception in the realm of ideas and practice, well 
before the end of the 1939-1945 war until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 
1949.  Further, this study considers the interests of the Soviet Union and, in doing so, 
includes influences of state politics and events beyond its own membership and the 
region it was chartered to serve.  Thus, the present work provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of the issues related to NATO’s formation than other works on the subject, 
and it provides a historical format beneficial to other observers who may choose to follow 
this study with a similar examination from a more Soviet-oriented perspective.  
Additionally, as nation-states around the globe are increasingly developing their 
economic capabilities, they are forming regional economic associations and considering 
methods by which they can protect the successes borne by these regional enterprises.  
NATO has provided the world with a noteworthy example of regional peace through 
integrated economic and military capacity.  It has endured as an alliance despite the fall 
of communism in Europe, and of the Soviet Union due, in part, “to the non-military 
utility of NATO and its capacity to act as a force for stability in an uncertain post-Cold 
War world.”1  By providing a detailed explanation of the influences beyond its region of 
                                                 
1 Ian Q. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination. (New York: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), ix. 
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interest, this work on NATO’s formation can offer issues for statesmen to consider when 
establishing those newer regional institutions. 
2. Lessons 
The pre and early history of NATO, from 1944 to until 1950, signifies a remote 
period in the minds of young officers and defense civilians interested in the past and 
present of war and peace in Europe form the perspective of the early 21st century.  In the 
view of many in the chattering classes in the first years of the present century, NATO has 
seemed, to many, like a tired, worn out thing, destined for the junk heap.  These distant 
years are solely connected with the end of the Second World War and the rise of US-
Soviet antagonism.  Oddly enough, and in contrast to such a tendentious view, the 
alliance is now fully engaged in the 21st century at war and peace, and, as a consequence, 
the question must arise what insights about statecraft, diplomacy, and strategy can be 
gleaned from the origins of NATO, and what does this story have to say to the present, 
amid a world of proliferating chaos and war?   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. History and Policy 
The scholarship on NATO as it has evolved since the 1950s forms the basis for 
this work.  Such scholarship in the realm of political science has been joined since the 
1980s by the writing of contemporary historians, which forms the second pillar of this 
study.  Numerous authorities have written on the subject of NATO’s formation and 
development with variation in depth, breadth, and focus.  While each pays tribute to 
history in some way, most works begin coverage of the subject after the end of World 
War II.  While this is an understandable point of departure for European history in 
general, the basic principle and concepts inherent within NATO existed well before its 
time, and much writing on this institution is too narrow in scope.  Some authors address 
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NATO’s conceptual origins briefly, only as a foundation for their deeper exploration of 
its formation, or address the advent of NATO as background information for their various 
arguments. 
Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, wrote a concise 
history of the alliance’s first five years.2  His first chapter touches on the institution’s 
historical background, but does so lightly.3  The remainder is written with an over-riding 
view on the institution’s development from a perspective internal to the alliance and 
among its members.  It is a useful chronology and introduction to NATO and its 
development, but is limited in its detail of political events surrounding the alliance.  
Perhaps it was timely propaganda to celebrate the resolution of the German rearmament 
issue, which brought a great relief to member states after years of negotiations, debate, 
and frustration.  However limited this contemporary work might have been, Ismay and 
his staff nonetheless highlighted the key facts and themes of the foundation of an 
organization to effectuate the ideals and values of the alliance.  
Writers who focus on a specific aspect of the alliance’s development address its 
history only on a few points, and do cover them in depth.  Examples include the process 
of engaging the United States in an enduring peacetime military treaty, the importance of 
Germany to Europe’s recovery, or how the alliance members interacted amongst 
themselves.  In his book designed to “demonstrate the importance of traditional intra-
European politics in shaping … the U.S. commitment to Europe,”4 Timothy Ireland 
explores the rationale for unprecedented U.S. foreign policy changes after World War II 
as exhibited by the United States’ role in NATO.  As he does, Ireland criticizes the 
traditional view of U.S. involvement as merely a function of the Cold War, and asserts a 
dual-purpose motive.   In the near term, he writes, the United States wanted to allow 
Europe to recover from the war without Soviet interference.  The long-term US goal was 
to restore the balance of power in Europe through a unity of western nation-states 
                                                 
2 Hastings L. Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years 1949-1954. (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 1955). http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/index.htm, accessed January 2006. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 7. 
 7
offsetting the rising Soviet Union5 in a proactive way that would share that burden with 
Europe, instead of retracing the steps of history in which the United States reacted to 
European matters.  He identifies the possibility of a renewed German threat to Europe as 
the central issue for initial U.S. involvement in the security of Western Europe after the 
war.  Further, he recognizes that the differences among Allies over Germany’s future 
during the 1947 post-war treaty negotiations in Moscow signaled the turning point for US 
policy on Europe.   
Ireland also covers the United States’ domestic debate over Germany’s future and 
the idea of an alliance with Europe in great detail, clearly illustrating the divergent 
outlooks of traditional isolationism and progressive engagement in European affairs.  He 
is equally thorough in his description of the processes through which the treaty was 
created, ratified, and enacted, and the way that the organization itself matured.  While 
Ireland explains that differences over Germany were being made known at the post-war 
peace conferences, he offers little insight into the circumstances surrounding those 
disagreements.  These could not have been the turning point had not momentum already 
been building behind them.  Among the three Western Allies, uncertainty of and 
confusion over the Soviet Union’s plans, actions, and motives provided inertia for their 
suspicion of it, which existed and was made known well before postwar negotiations with 
the USSR broke down in 1947. 
Lawrence Kaplan views NATO as a unique institution of modern diplomacy, 
distinct from others designed to preserve peace that had come before.  He considers the 
postwar reconstruction of Europe that began with the Marshall Plan to have been the 
basis for the alliance, takes the geo-political environment that surrounded the alliance 
formation into account.  He addresses both aspects head-on, suggesting that “a divided 
Germany would be reunited under Soviet auspices.”6  Although he clearly presents the 
importance placed on the fate of Germany from the Western perspective, he does not go 
so far as to say that Germany’s revitalization was central to U.S foreign policy. 
                                                 
5 Ireland, 4. 
6 Lawrence S. Kaplan. The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: The 
University Press of Kentucky: 1984), 2. 
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Adhering to conventional perspective of Brussels Treaty of 1948 as basis for 
North Atlantic Treaty, Kaplan portrays the Brussels pact as a mechanism for European 
statesmen to “manipulate the New World.”7  He describes the United States’ national 
debate as a two-side affair between those who favored working exclusively through the 
recently-founded UN and those who understood the rationale behind the Treaty.  Further 
he explains the influence of that debate on the Treaty itself, and how similar debates 
among eventual member states made progress a slow process, but one that produced an 
organization that yielded impressive results.  His final assessment of the alliance is a best 
available means for coordination and cooperation on issues related to Europe and the 
Atlantic community. 
Authors of other important works on NATO that contain a historic perspective 
begin with the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1947.  Thomas does this,8 as does 
Stanley Sloan.9  Since their viewpoints are internal, focused on the alliance’s creation and 
subsequent progress, little attention is paid to the broader environment surrounding the 
North Atlantic area.  In making their points, these authors focus in on the events that 
address specific issues, but do not elaborate on them or include other events which occur 
beyond that realm, forcing one to look elsewhere in the body of 20th century history for a 
more global understanding of the context within which NATO was formed.  Had not the 
Korean War been such a significant influence on the structural development of NATO as 
an institution, one may never conceive that events beyond the North Atlantic area had 
any influence on NATO. 
Stephen Ambrose addresses the history of United States foreign policy from 1938 
to 1985 in Rise to Globalism.  In his view, the U.S. attitude toward peace changed during 
and after World War II.  Economic changes in the postwar era left the United States at the 
apex of the international market, but exposed to foreign threats.  As a result, the U.S. 
                                                 
7 Kaplan, 2. 
8 Thomas, 10. 
9 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic 
Bargain Reconsidered (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: 2003), 1. 
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needed to promote democracy in order to compete in foreign markets.10   He contends 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an alliance with the Brussels Pact signatories, that 
the U.S. officially expressed its intention to join in 1948, and that these Western actions 
threatened the USSR’s security.11  While he does address the effect of international 
events after the war on U.S. policy to a degree, he only introduces NATO at the signing 
of the treaty, and offers minimal insight on how the economic, military, or political 
events that preceded the treaty affected or were related to the alliance’s formation. 
Illuminating this area in his interpretation of postwar European history, Tony Judt 
recognizes that many elements of the Cold War existed well before V-E Day, and that 
“the Cold War began not after the Second World War but following the end of the 
First.”12 In fact, Judt characterizes the interwar period as an “interlude in an international 
struggle between Western democracies and Soviet totalitarianism,” and the mutual 
distrust between the two camps had ripened over time, resulting in ideological 
polarization at the end of WWII and subsequent realpolitik.13  He presents American and 
British foreign strategic priorities developed during the war, as well as details of Soviet 
intentions and actions throughout the war and the immediate postwar period, and how 
they contrasted as the “new era in Europe was being born” with “the schism between East 
and West; the contest between Communism and capitalism;” and other characteristics of 
the period described as “accidental outcomes of history.”14 
Like Judt, Marc Trachtenberg covers European history in the postwar era in A 
Constructed Peace, but does so with a shorter timeline.  As he explains “how peace came 
to the world of the great powers … during the period of 1945 to 1963,”15 he addresses 
several major issues, including the partition of Poland, the division of Germany and 
                                                 
10 Stephen E. Ambrose. Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 4th Rev. Ed. (New 
York:  Penguin Books: 1986): xiv-xvi. 
11 Ibid., 100-102. 
12 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin Group: 2005): 103. 
13 Judt,  104-106. 
14 Ibid., 1-2. 
15 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), vii. 
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challenges of German, as well as overall Western European, economic recovery. 
Providing a great degree of information on France’s role in the postwar era, Trachtenberg 
insightfully notes that “victory did not mean peace,” and that the postwar disagreements 
and conflicts that many people thought may result in a third world war instead were 
manifested in “what came to be called the Cold War.”16  He makes the interesting 
assertion that “for … the French generally … the German threat could serve as a cover 
for arrangements that were really designed to deal with the Russian problem,”17 asserting 
that “the Soviet threat was the overriding concern”18 for the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty  
between France and Great Britain, the North Atlantic Treaty’s first postwar ancestor.  
Despite the commonly-held view that “the Dunkirk Treaty had been aimed expressly 
against a renewed German aggression.”19  While Judt and Trachtenberg address the broad 
postwar period, they limit their work to Europe and the United States.   Ambrose’s work 
has a global scope, but lacks sufficient detail to provide readers a full understanding of 
events beyond the North Atlantic area on the formation and development of NATO. 
One significant work of contemporary history on the origins of the cold war that 
avails itself of new, important sources is that of  John Lewis Gaddis’ We Now Know, in 
which he presents a Soviet perspective on the events of the postwar era, as well as a 
Western one.  Gaddis describes both the Soviet Union and United States as empires, 
covers both states from as early as World War I, and writes that “Stalin’s determination 
to create his empire preceded by some years the conditions that made it possible”20 at the 
war’s end in Europe.  He describes Stalin’s mismanagement of his empire through it 
strained relationship with Yugoslavia, the failings of other European Communists, and 
the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan.21  From the Western European perspective, 
                                                 
16 Trachtenberg, 3. 
17 Ibid., 85. 
18 Marc Trachtenberg, “Appendix Two (Chapter Three, Note 74): The German Threat as a Pretext for 
Defense against Russia” (1999). 
http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/appendices/appendixII.html, accessed August 2006.  
19 Ismay. “The Brussels Treaty,” Chap. 1. 
20 Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, England: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 33. 
21 Gaddis, 40-43, 46-49. 
 11
Gaddis contends that states “insisted that their security required a military shield as well 
as an economic jump start,” and the American “empire arose … by invitation,”22 
seemingly countering Ambrose’s proposal that the United States had intended to enter 
into an alliance with Brussels Pact states. 
In addition to the many books addressing NATO and 20th century European 
history, there are a number of articles that cover specific aspects of NATO’s formation 
and development in its first decade that are relevant to this study.  Significantly, the 
concept the American empire by invitation that Gaddis describes was explored by Gier 
Lundestad in relation to the U.S.’s expanding postwar role throughout the world.  He 
addresses the nature of U.S. influence, the American prioritization of and involvement in 
Western Europe, and the role the U.S. took in the development of NATO’s institutional 
growth.23  In one of the most enlightening articles on the subject, Cees Wiebes and Bert 
Zeeman describe the treaty’s development “at the end of March 1948 in utmost secrecy 
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada at the Pentagon.”24  The 
timing of these talks, just after the signing of the Brussels Pact and prior to the 
“preliminary talks which led to the North Atlantic Treaty … between the State 
Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and the Brussels Treaty Powers,”25 indicates 
that the idea of such an alliance had already been conceived and agreed upon. 
Although each of these works addresses the period under examination by this 
paper, none of them addresses the subject from the emergence of the concepts upon 
which it founded after World War I through to the time when it became a functioning 
organization actually capable achieving its purpose following the initiation of the Korean 
War.  While some of these texts address issues beyond the North Atlantic area, they do 
                                                 
22 Gaddis, 52.  
23 Gier Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” 
Journal of Peace Research, 23:4 (1986): 266-272, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433 
%28198609%2923%3A3%3C263%AEBITUS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L, accessed February 2006. 
24 Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, “The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North 
Atlantic Treaty,” International Affairs, 59:3 (1983): 352-353. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
5850%28198322%2959%3A3%3C351%3ATPNM1T53E2.0.CO%3B2-G, accessed February 2006. 
25 Ismay, “Negotiating the Atlantic Treaty,” Chap. 1. 
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not do so in a manner which accounts for the full spectrum of events that influenced the 
decisions related to NATO’s formation. 
2. Theories of International Politics, International Relations, and 
Cooperation 
This question and these issues can adequately be covered in a study including 
political theory and events of the period from 1945 to 1950.  Relevant theories include 
Neorealism, Political Idealism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism presented by Morgenthau, 
Herz, and Keohane.  A survey of historical works on the genesis of NATO addresses the 
environment in which the alliance was created, from the geopolitical, military, and 
economic situation in Europe to the postwar goals and policies of the victorious Allied 
Powers; further, such works describe the efforts of the powers toward peace and future 
security.  As postwar negotiations were conducted, statesmen and policymakers in Great 
Britain and the United States sensed a growing rift between their objectives and those of 
the Soviet Union, and numerous governments of Eastern European countries were 
converting to Communism, which held a presence in some Western European 
governments, as well.  Statesmen of Western European nations, ravaged by the war, were 
concerned that they would also succumb to this expanding influence, and were relatively 
helpless to prevent it.  United States policymakers were also concerned, and steps were 
taken on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to ensure that democracy was maintained in 
Western Europe.  Ultimately, NATO was created to ensure their collective defense 
against the threat they perceived, and this is shown in Ireland’s and Thomas’ books, as 
well as in Thies’ Friendly Rivals. 
a. Realism 
According to the realist theory of international politics, “statesmen think 
and act in terms of interest as defined by power,” who will pursue “rational foreign 
policy” that minimizes risks and maximizes benefits,” while recognizing that “political 
action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context 
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within which foreign policy is formed.”26  It holds that members of anarchic societies are 
“concerned about their security” and “are driven to acquire more and more power in 
order to escape the impact of the power of others.”  When units cooperate with one 
another to acquire power, they are still driven to the same ends, but do so at a collective 
level, and this will eventually cause conflict.  Political Realism considers the “actual 
tendencies of international politics” that is characterized, at the extreme, by integral 
nationalism of “exclusive, aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic national policies.”  
In contrast, Political Idealism is typified by “equal, free, and self-determining 
nationalities, each organized into its own state, and all living peacefully side by side.”27 
b. Institutionalism 
Neo liberal Institutionalism differs from neo realism in regard to “changes 
that result from shifts in relative state capabilities,”28 because states do not always act “to 
prevent others from achieving advances” in them.29  It introduces the concept of 
“complex interdependence” that “characterizes relationships among democratic 
industrialized countries,” wherein “power is an important element in relationships…but 
does not derive from the use or threat of force toward one another,”30 as evidenced by 
“U.S. policy toward Europe or Japan for at least twenty years after World War II, or the 
relationships among members of the European Community.”31  However, the two schools 
are in alignment on two other points.  First, neoliberalism agrees with the Realist 
contention that states are the key elements in the international system and that context is 
an important factor in their behaviors, but that “formal and informal rules play a much 
larger role.”  Additionally, it rests on the conditions that actors have “mutual interests; 
                                                 
26 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th ed. (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 5, 8-9. 
27 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2 (1950): 157-
158. 
28 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations 
Theory (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989), 8. 
29 Ibid., 10. 
30 Ibid., 9. 
31 Ibid., 10. 
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that is, they must potentially gain from their cooperation,” and that “variations in the 
degree of institutionalization exert substantial effects on state behavior.”  Therefore, 
“cooperation is possible but depends in par on institutional arrangements,”32 which 
include commonality, specificity, and autonomy.33  Second, neoliberalists and neorealists 
also agree that states will act rationally, in that they “calculate the costs and benefits of 
contemplated courses of action.”34 Thus, when states are able to maximize benefit and 
minimize cost, or risk, by acting in concert with others who share a common interest, 
they would be expected to cooperate, and this is where institutions are significant, 
because they “make it possible for states to take actions that would otherwise be 
inconceivable” and “affect the costs associated with alternatives that might have existed 
independently.”35 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
As the Cold War slipped into history at the end of the Twentieth Century, so did 
many symbols, weapons, and institutions of security, war, and peace that had arisen in the 
aftermath of World War II.  The Soviets scrapped their SS20 missiles in 1987, the 
Hungarians cut down the barbed wire along their Austrian border in May of 1989, the 
Communists lost parliamentary control to the Solidarity movement in Poland in the same 
season, and, soon thereafter, the Berlin Wall began to fall in November of 1989.  In 1990, 
the German Democratic Republic vanished and its states joined the Federal Republic of 
Germany under Article 23 of the Basic Law.  The following year, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) met its demise, as did the Warsaw Treaty Organization.  
Despite the dissolution of many prominent Cold War entities, one has remained and has 
grown in both size and scope since the Cold War’s end.  The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) proved its capability in the Balkans a decade ago, is currently 
conducting military operations in Afghanistan, and its membership now includes ten 
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34 Ibid., 11. 
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former Communist and Soviet satellite states.  That an alliance established in the 
aftermath of World War II to provide mutual defense for “the West” has endured and 
undergone such a significant shift in focus and broadened membership and focus that 
draws it ever farther to “the East,” it is appropriate to revisit the basis in diplomacy, 
strategy, and society upon which NATO was founded and ask, “Why and how was 
NATO created,” and what does this story suggest about the possible causes of such 
endurance over time? 
To answer this broad question, it is helpful to break it down into two minor 
questions regarding the rationale for NATO and the process by which it was established.  
First, why was NATO formed?  That is, what was the threat, and how did it manifest 
itself in the minds of makers of policy in the years 1947-1949?  How did the Soviet 
Union transform from wartime ally of Western nation-states to peacetime adversary?  
What were the critical events that led to its emergence as such, and why was the UN 
unable to address the threat adequately?  What were the underlying concepts for NATO, 
and when were they developed?  Second, how was NATO formed?  Specifically, what 
were the steps in alliance formation?  What were the institutional structures of the 
alliance?  How and when were those structures developed, and what were the critical 
events related to that end? 
One can pose the following major debates about and/or approaches to the issue at 
hand.  In the first instance, there is the question of collective defense versus collective 
security concepts in the formative years of the alliance.  One can ask if NATO was a 
result of bargain between the US, who wanted Germany revitalized, and Western 
European powers, who wanted military and economic aid for their own postwar recovery 
and security.  Further, there is the question if the Soviet Union, not Germany, was the 
threat against which the Dunkirk and Brussels treaties were designed. Moreover, did 
Stalin have an imperial postwar goal and a plan to achieve it?  One can concisely suggest 
such major questions and arguments as follows – what forces beyond the period typically 
studied in NATO and postwar European history influenced NATO’s creation and 
structure? 
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In response to above catalog of questions, one can argue that NATO history has 
been too narrowly focused on the years 1948 and 1949.  Chronologically, its story usually 
begins with the 1947 Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council in Berlin.  While 
the events and decisions of these years are unarguable important, the decisions made by 
statesmen regarding the establishment of this alliance were influenced by ideas and 
events from earlier times.  In the work at hand, the author wishes to re interpret the 
historical influences on the North Atlantic Treaty and the character of NATO, the 
organization, as a kind of inventory of historical knowledge.  Only with a chronological 
view of events from a broad perspective can we truly understand the full weight of the 
conditions under which NATO was formed and developed, and it is the object of this 
thesis to provide a comprehensive history of NATO’s formation in order for readers to 
fully appreciate the gravity of the environments within which those decisions were made. 
E.  METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The present study is a historical interpretation with a nod to the needs of the 
policy-maker who must operate according to the principles of collective defense and the 
ideals embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty.  It will initially address the interwar period 
of the 20th century, focusing on collective interstate agreements that affected the 
Europe/North Atlantic region and color the region’s political landscape.  Subsequently, a 
chronology of events occurring and ideas emerging prior to and during the Second World 
War that laid the foundation for postwar negotiations and the North Atlantic Treaty is 
presented.  In both of these sections, the events will be presented chronologically. 
In the 21st century, NATO has continued its adaptation to meet the challenges of 
transnational, non-state terrorism, and is currently conducting operations well beyond the 
area for which it was initially intended.  NATO matters, and in this connection, the 
origins of the alliance have something to say about why the alliance has changed and 
endured into the violent and troubled present.  The study that follows tries to speculate on 
the value of this pre and early history of NATO and of the explanatory power of these 
years in two instances.  First, because such is important as history in and of itself.  One 
does need to have a sophisticated knowledge of these transformative years in the age of 
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total war.  Second, there are useful policy insights and generalizations that new members 
of NATO can glean from the essence and operation if the alliance in fact, the actual 
record of the past.  It is to this agenda that the following study is devoted. 
1. Primary Sources 
This study relies heavily on primary sources.  Speeches given by Winston 
Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and members of the United States and other allied governments 
are critical to understanding those leaders’ lines of thinking during the era.  Telegrams, 
memoranda, interviews, reports, and other official documents will provide similar 
insights.  The following sources are a few of those that will provide such information on 
the subject: 
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization On-line Library 
• The Avalon Project, Yale University 
• Truman Library 
• Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. 
2. Secondary Sources 
An abundance of secondary sources, including the aforementioned books and 
journal articles, are also drawn upon in this research to bring the pertinent issues to light.  
Books covering foreign policies of Western nation-states and the Soviet Union, and 
journal articles on various aspects of NATO’s formation, as well as other periodicals, 
such as NATO Update and NATO Review, offer such vital information  
 18
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II. WHY NATO WAS FORMED 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
With the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the League of Nations was established and 
initially had forty-one members from across the globe.  It grew in the succeeding years, 
and experienced a good deal of success through the hopeful period of the 1920s.  It was, 
however, also marked by failures of preventing conflict beginning in 1931, and the 
outbreak of World War II signaled its ultimate demise.  In the aftermath of that war, the 
United Nations was established in 1945, based upon conditions and concepts set in a 
series of meetings, conferences, and declarations between June 1941 and September 
1945.36  Upon its ratification by Security Council members and a majority of the others, 
the UN Charter went into effect.37  At that time, Europe was in need of economic and 
industrial renewal as it transition from war to peace for the second time in the 20th 
century.  As Western European and North American nation-states redeployed their forces 
on the continent, sent others home, and drew them down in size, the Soviet Union 
maintained and expanded its influence and presence in post-World War II Eastern 
Europe.  Western European nation-states were concerned that they may be overtaken by 
this uncertain expansion, and banded together through the Brussels Treaty, but neither 
that, nor the United Nations, seemed sufficient to protect achieve their economic and 
emergent security interests.  The United States’ postwar economic and military strength 
were seen as their bulwark against Soviet encroachment, and the NATO was created to 
provide for the collective defense of selected nation-states spanning the region. 
                                                 
36 United Nations, “The Declaration of St. James’s Palace,” History of the Charter of the United 
Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history/, accessed April 2006. 
37 United Nations, “About the United Nations History,” History of the UN. 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm, accessed April 2006. 
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1. Earlier Institutions 
a. The League of Nations 
Prior to the 1949 creation of NATO, there were two other international 
bodies designed to maintain peace and security in the world.  At the conclusion of World 
War I, the concept of collective security was pursued with the establishment of the 
League of Nations, “to promote international cooperation, and to achieve peace and 
security.”38  Despite its numerous successful decisions, it was also marked by failures to 
prevent international conflict among its members.  Japan and Italy violated terms of the 
League, in 1931 and 1935, respectively.  Others failed to take sufficient measures to deter 
aggression and its membership dwindled.  The League was eventually perceived as a 
powerless organization, and the outbreak of World War II signaled its ultimate demise.39 
b. The United Nations 
Despite the failure of the League, the dream of collective security endured, 
especially in the heat of total war.  In June of 1945, the United Nations was chartered “to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind.”40  Having learned from the weaknesses of the LoN, 
the UN had US membership and a Security Council to enforce its resolutions, with Great 
Britain, France, the USSR, the US, and China as permanent members.41  Upon 
ratification of the United Nations Charter, the organization became a reality.  The 
provisions of this organization for the imposition of the ideas of collective security were 
given special significance in Article 51 of the UN Charter and the issue of compliance of 
the powers remained in late 1945, in the wake of the war’s end. 
                                                 
38 John P. Vloyantes, “The Significance of Pre-Yalta Policies regarding Liberated Countries in 
Europe,” The Western Political Quarterly, 11:2 (1958), 213. http://links.jstor.orc/sici?sici=0043-
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39 League of Nations, Essential Facts about the League of Nations, Tenth Ed. (Revised) (Geneva: 
LON Information Section, 1939), 11-29. 
40 United Nations, “About the United Nations History.” 
41 United Nations, “Members.” 
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2. Wartime Agreements and Rhetoric 
Throughout the course of the war, there were numerous meetings and conferences 
among the Allied Powers regarding the course of the war and post-war security 
arrangements.  In June of 1941 the governments of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and a representative of the Free French 
met at St. James’ Palace in London and signed a declaration that: 
The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free 
peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may 
enjoy economic and social security; … It is our intention to work together, 
and with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end.42 
In August, Churchill and Roosevelt met and agreed upon a set of postwar national 
principles that included no territorial or other type of aggrandizement, no territorial 
changes that were not in line with the desires of people who would be affected by them, 
restoration of self-determined government and sovereign rights, establishment of peace 
that provided nations safety within their borders, freedom of the seas, disarmament of 
aggressive nations, equal access to trade and economic resources, and economic 
collaboration.43 These principles were set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and the following 
month, the European governments who met, along with the Soviet Union, at St. James’ 
Palace in London.  All agreed to these principles and declared “their intention to 
cooperate to the best of their ability in giving effect to them” at London.  Notably, the 
Soviet ambassador made the following statement: 
The Soviet Union defends the right of every nation to the independence 
and territorial integrity of its country and its right to establish such a social 
order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and 
necessary for the better promotion of its economic and cultural prosperity. 
                                                 
42 United Nations, “The Declaration of St. James’s Palace.” 
43 Atlantic Charter.  http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/atlantic.htm, accessed April 2006. 
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He added that the Soviet Union advocated the necessity of collective action against 
aggressors and that “the Soviet Government proclaims its agreement with the 
fundamental principles of the declaration of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.”44 
While these two events are integral to the creation of the UN, they also indicate 
that the governments of the USSR and Eastern European states were aligned with the 
west on these principles as early as 1942.  During discussions for the 1942 Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty, the USSR presented policy objectives for its borders to be restored to those of 
June 22, 1941, and for permitting only “‘friendly,’ anti-fascist’ regimes on her borders.”  
Those borders reflected those of the Russian Empire before the First World War, and 
would provide security against any future attacks from Western Europe.45  At Yalta in 
1945, the “Big Three” agreed to “the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government 
to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations” for 
Europe.46  Stalin surprising agreement to “‘free and unfettered elections as soon as 
possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot’ and also to ‘reorganize’ the 
Polish government by bringing in Poles from London” was encouraging to Roosevelt and 
Churchill. 47  In addition to the Europe’s future, topics at Yalta included Iran, the Black 
Sea Straits, Japan, and the United Nations organization. 
Yalta was the last conference Roosevelt would attend with his allied 
contemporaries.  Upon Roosevelt’s death, he was succeeded as President by Harry 
Truman who, as a Senator, had clearly offered his views regarding the Nazis and 
Russians, recently engaged in Operation Barbarossa, just two weeks after the 1941 
Declaration at St. James Palace, stating: 
If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia 
is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many 
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as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any 
circumstances. Neither of them thinks anything of their pledged word.48 
Four years later, in a telegram to Truman shortly after the German surrender, 
Churchill also expressed misgivings about the Soviets, who had taken control of Poland, 
the Baltic States, and parts of Finland during the course of the war.  His comments were 
focused toward post-war Europe, in which he characterized Russia as a powerful and 
unrecognized threat: 
… What is to happen about Russia? ... I feel deep anxiety because of … 
the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or 
occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other 
countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the 
field.  An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know 
what is going on behind... A broad band of many hundreds of miles will 
isolate us from Poland… Meanwhile, the attention of our peoples will be 
occupied in inflicting severities upon Germany, which is ruined and 
prostrate, and it would be open to the Russians in a very short time to 
advance, if they chose, to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic ....49 
On 22 April at Washington, Truman told Molotov “that he wanted free elections in 
Poland.”  Molotov acknowledged his position, but expressed that “Poland was ‘even 
more important for the Soviet Union’ “because of its neighboring location.  The 
following day, Truman was more direct, and told Molotov to meet the Yalta agreements 
regarding Poland.50  
3. Postwar Conditions 
a. 1945 
The fact that the Second World War was over did not mean peace had 
blanketed the globe.  In Europe, two battles continued:  at the southern extreme, the 
Greek Civil War between Communists and Greek Nationalists had been ongoing since 
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December 1944; to the north, the Baltic nations continued to resist the Soviets, who had 
re-occupied those states during the war.  The Soviet Union also maintained a presence in 
the Iran, despite the requirement to remove troops six months after war ended,51 and were 
providing instructions to form a separatist movement in northern Iran as a means to 
access oil resources there.52  The Iranian government resisted demands to give 
Azerbaijan a greater degree of autonomy “for fear of augmenting Communist influence 
elsewhere in Iran.”53  In the Far East, the Chinese Civil War continued between U.S.-
supported Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Communist forces.  
Actions, words, and reactions to them would hamper the overall postwar peace process, 
and would eventually divide Europe itself, east from west. 
After the German surrender in May of 1945, the “Big Three” met again in 
Potsdam to discuss the further issues of war termination and peace.  Settling issues for 
Germany held center stage, but settling the war with the other Axis states in a manner 
which would establish conditions to prevent future war was also critical to the figures at 
hand.  To do so, the leaders established a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), comprised 
of their along with those of France and China, to confer on a regular basis, and gave 
highest priority given to drafting “treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on 
the termination of the war in Europe.”  They set forth the condition that peace treaties 
would be made “with recognized democratic governments in these States,” enabling their 
applications for UN membership and later, depending upon conditions, establish 
“diplomatic relations … to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties 
with those countries.”  As well, the CFM was charged with “the preparation of a peace 
settlement for Germany, to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a 
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government adequate for the purpose is established.”54  The Potsdam Conference also 
included discussions beyond Europe, in which it became clear that “the Soviets wanted to 
participate with Turkey in the control of the Black Sea straits.” As an alternative, Truman 
made a proposal for an “international guarantee that the straits would be open to all 
nations at all times.”55 
Despite Germany’s unconditional surrender to both the Allied 
Expeditionary Force and the Supreme High Command of the Red Army,56 the Allies’ 
determination to develop peace treaties with all former Axis states, and the establishment 
of the UN, European nations were still very concerned with Germany as a future military 
threat.  It had been an aggressor in both World Wars and had been uncooperative with the 
victors’ attempts at economic reconstruction after the First.  Leading up to and during the 
Second war, Germany had violated agreements made with other states across the 
continent, and other European countries were understandably determined to prevent 
Germany from accumulating the clout or capability to do any such thing again.  In June 
of 1945, General Eisenhower issued a written declaration stating, “The Governments of 
the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United 
Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume 
supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government 
or authority.” This document addressed military issues, national borders, and the civilian 
issues of politics, administration, and economics.  It called for the “complete 
disarmament and demilitarization of Germany … for future peace and security,” 
specifying that the Allies “will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of 
Germany as they may determine.”57 
                                                 
54 “Potsdam Conference,” (1945). http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm, 
accessed  April 2006. 
55 Ambrose, 69. 
56 “German Act of Military Surrender signed at Berlin on the 8th day of May, 1945.” 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/gs11.htm 
57 “Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied 
Powers,” June 5, 1945.  http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/ger01.htm. 
 26
Also in June, the Soviet government began developing and financing 
northern Iranian separatist movements in violation of the Big Three’s agreements on 
Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity made at Tehran in 1943.58  Intending to access 
to oil resources there, the Soviet efforts were designed to establish “a national 
autonomous Azerbaijan district … with broad powers within the Iranian state” and a 
national autonomous Kurdish district, and to influence Iran’s parliamentary elections.59  
In August, the Soviet Union dispatched geological survey teams, with instructions to 
begin drilling in September.60  In the fall, de Gaulle visited Truman in Washington and, 
as Churchill had done through his telegram in the spring, expressed his own concerns 
about the “the Red Army in Central Europe.”  In turn, Truman assured him that the US 
would use the bomb to stop any aggression.” 61 
At London, the first CFM convened in September to begin discussion on 
conditions for peace with European members of the Axis.  These discussions also 
included the role of United Nations, specifically with regard to issues affecting Italy.  
There seemed to be widespread confidence among the Foreign Ministers of his new 
institution’s capability, as shown in US Secretary of State James Byrnes’ report, “… that 
Italy should rely on the United Nations for protection against aggression … and this view 
gained general acceptance.”  However, the optimism for the U.N. expressed at this 
meeting was overshadowed by disagreement between the Soviet delegation and the 
others.  In the Western view, the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria did not meet the 
conditions of self-determination agreed upon at Yalta, and specified as “democratic” at 
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Potsdam, so the US and Britain had not recognized them diplomatically, and considered 
them ineligible for conclusion of peace treaties.62  Soviet adamancy for Western 
recognition of “the puppet governments in Eastern Europe before peace treaties could be 
written”63 was met by resistance from the others, and was the first of what would prove 
to be many differences between the Soviet and other delegations throughout the postwar 
peace treaty-development process.  In response, the Soviet Delegation withdrew its 
agreement to the process by which the Council would develop peace treaties, which was 
based upon an agreement reached at Potsdam in May - and had been established only a 
week before.  Essentially, this Soviet objection made continuation of the London CFM 
useless.  In light of this impasse, the first CFM adjourned without significant progress on 
the treaties.  As the delegations departed, they took with them Byrnes’ hopes to convene 
a 5-treaty peace conference by the end of the year. 64  While this session was largely 
unsuccessful, Byrnes did note Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s 
apprehension about security issues in the Balkans, and he “suggested a twenty-five year 
four-power treaty, to keep Germany disarmed as a means of preventing any real threat to 
Soviet security,” which he developed and subsequently presented to his counterparts.65 
The United Nations Charter was ratified in October, and the global 
organization had become a reality. It was soon to face its first challenge over Soviet 
action in northern Iran where “Stalin wanted oil concessions.”66  The US had made 
efforts for all Allied forces to be removed from Iran by the New Year, but in December, 
while Britain and the U.S. were withdrawing their troops from Iran, “Communists 
announced the creation of a new government in Tabriz, capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, 
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under Ja’far Pinshevari, a veteran Communist and Comintern agent.”67  Activists in the 
nearby province of Kordestan followed Azerbaijan’s lead, and “both autonomous 
republics enjoyed the support of the Soviets, and Soviet troops,” who “prevented 
government forces from entering Azarbaijan and Kordestan,”68 which was a clear 
violation of the Tehran agreements.69  
In December, an interim CFM session was being held at Moscow.  There, 
the impasse from London was overcome and, although issues on Germany were deferred, 
the conference made substantial progress.  All UN members that fought against the 
European Axis powers were able to review the soon-to-be-developed treaties, paving the 
way for a peace conference to be held by May.70  In addition, the ministers agreed on 
Allied assistance to Eastern European governments for democratization, on the 
establishment of a UN commission to control atomic energy, and on the need for China to 
unify democratically, with Soviet and US troops being withdrawn from the country.  
Further, they decided to re-establish Korea as an independent state, with a Joint 
Commission, represented by the USSR in the north and the U.S. in the south, to aid 
Korean re-emergence.71  In a separate discussion while in Moscow, Byrnes proposed the 
treaty idea he had offered to Molotov at London regarding German disarmament treaty to 
Stalin, and received his endorsement of it.72 
As 1945 drew to a close and the New Year dawned, there was much cause 
for optimism across the globe.  The war of unprecedented scale and atrocity that had 
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raged since 1939 had ended.  The victorious Allies had overcome a diplomatic impasse 
and were in now in accord on conditions for peace.  All UN states that had been 
victimized by the Axis Powers were to be involved in the peace process, and a Peace 
Conference was within reach.  Arrangements had been made for the military and civil 
occupation of Germany to restructure it into a peaceful and economically vital nation, and 
a similar plan for Japan was forthcoming.  The United Nations was operational, and the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund were focusing on removing the economic 
conditions had been so integral to both world wars. 
b. 1946 
As 1946 dawned in Europe, it brought the continuing spread of 
communism.  On 11 January, Albanian communists, who had “conquered governmental 
power and their national capital” two years earlier, eliminated the monarchy and replaced 
it with a people’s republic.73  Throughout the year, Communists would win parliamentary 
elections in Czechoslovakia Bulgaria, and Rumania, where the king followed the 
elections with a royal declaration of “Soviet-oriented foreign policy, and take nearly half 
the parliament seats in France.74  Stalin’s goal for Soviet expansion was to “impose its 
own social system as far as its armies could reach.”  Even before Germany’s defeat, he 
had focused in areas where organized resistance was low,75 and he would now turn 
toward the Middle East, where tensions would reach their “peak in Iran and Turkey” later 
in the year.76 
The war of words spilled over into 1946.  On 19 January, Iran appealed to 
the UN regarding the USSR’s failure to withdraw its troops and its backing of the 
uprisings in Northern Iran in an attempt to coerce the central government to grant oil 
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concessions.77  In February, Stalin gave a speech in Moscow critical of the West, blaming 
capitalism for World Wars I and II, and pledging to continue the USSR’s industrial 
development in order to guarantee that “our Motherland will be insured against all 
contingencies.”78  In addition to Stalin’s words, Soviet actions throughout the year would 
aggravate the West throughout the year.  Stalin’s speech prompted the US Charge in 
Moscow, George Kennan, to send his “Long Telegram” to the State Department, 
cautioning that the Soviet Union was working on both official and unofficial levels to 
expand its influence and weaken non-communist systems,79 as it had been doing in the 
Baltic States and Iran.  
A month later, in a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, 
Churchill presented his metaphor of an “Iron Curtain” in Europe to the public, noting that 
the Soviet sphere increasingly influenced or controlled much of Eastern Europe.  
Although he did not consider war to be an imminent possibility, he did warn the audience 
of the USSR’s desire for “indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.”  Churchill 
called for the establishment of freedom and democracy in all countries, for settling the 
postwar peace, and for an understanding with Russia on all points.  He emphasized that 
the key to lasting peace was maintaining an understanding with the Soviets, under the 
authority of the UN, and he identified the balance of power system as the cause of 
Europe’s wars.  Declaring that system unsound, Churchill suggested that cooperation of 
US, British, and the English-speaking peoples of the Commonwealth in the fields of 
science, industry, and morals would establish an “overwhelming assurance of security,” 
eliminating the desire for a balance of power. 80 
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The very next day, prompted by the USSR’s refusal to abide by its March 
deadline to withdraw troops from Iran, Byrnes sent a demand to Moscow that the Soviet 
troops be pulled out immediately,81 and the British also confronted Stalin on his 
intentions there.82  Less than a week later, in the face of this combined criticism, Stalin 
responded to Churchill’s speech, likening him to Hitler for promoting racial theory.  
Stalin suggested the English-speaking nations would seek to rule the world through war, 
and he emphasized the Soviet contribution to Europe’s liberation from Hitler and the 
Soviet losses taken in that endeavor.  Countering Churchill’s assertion of Soviet 
expansionism, Stalin explained it merely as an attempt to ensure the USSR’s national 
security through loyal relationships with neighboring governments, and he explained the 
growth of communist influence in Eastern Europe as an understandable result of the fine 
example that communists had set while fighting fascism during the war.83 
While the rhetoric over Soviet expansion and English-speaking 
cooperation played out, the peace process trudged on.  Having informed the other 
ministers that he wanted to discuss it, Byrnes was eager to capitalize on the positive 
responses to his treaty proposal for the demilitarization of Germany received from Stalin, 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin, and French Foreign Minister 
Georges Bidault.  Yet, just as the western Allies had their concerns about the Soviet 
Union, the Soviets were also suspicious of their wartime partners.  Despite Stalin’s 
personal assent a few months earlier, Molotov replied with a surprising revelation that 
there were serious Soviet objections to the disarmament proposal.  He seemed to take 
that, and all other issues regarding Germany, quite lightly. He disagreed with the other 
Ministers on Italian reparations to the USSR, opposed them on the future or the 
Italy/Yugoslavia border region, and refused to even discuss a treaty for Austria.84 
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This Soviet obstinacy was compounded by general disagreement on 
economic issues, with some Western delegations balking at treaty issues for Italy, 
Yugoslavia, Austria, and Germany, and frustrating all involved.  Thus, the Paris CFM 
was, initially, a fruitless affair.  The overall dissonance delayed not only the Council’s 
development of peace treaties and any progress toward the political and economic 
reconstruction throughout much of the continent, but also affected the withdrawal of 
Allied troops from those regions, specifically in the Balkans and in Central Europe.  As a 
result, the Council decided to take a “recess to allow a calm reexamination of our 
respective positions,”85 and delayed the convening of a peace conference from May until 
late July.  Byrnes remained confident that the parties could reconcile their differences, 
and drew upon Churchill’s image in his report on the first part of the Paris CFM Byrnes, 
writing “there is no iron curtain that the aggregate sentiments of mankind cannot 
penetrate.”86 
That iron curtain soon became more than a clever allegory.  In late May, 
elections were held in Czechoslovakia where Communists won thirty-eight percent of the 
vote and installed a Communist prime minister, Klement Gottwald.87  By the time the 
Foreign Ministers reconvened in June, Communists had won nearly half the seats in the 
French Parliament.88  At the second session of the Paris CFM, some differences did get 
resolved, but the USSR continued to shy away from draft treaties regarding Germany, 
specifically its de-Nazification, disarmament, and future government.  Additional items 
pertaining to Germany, such as German reparations to the USSR and exclusion of the 
Saar region from centralized administration, were not even open for discussion with the 
Soviets.  Capitalizing on their limited success, the Council deferred issues on which they 
still differed and agreed to convene Peace Conference in Paris the following month.  
Byrnes was uncertain if the Soviets recognized that their resistance to the progress of the 
peace negotiations raised questions among the other Allies, Molotov rejected the treaty 
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proposal regarding disarmament, and it occurred to Byrnes that German militarism might 
become “a pawn in a struggle between the East and the West.…”89 
The divide between the Soviet Union and other Allies, particularly the 
United States, became more pronounced during the Paris Peace Conference that began in 
July.  With its seemingly arbitrary veto of proposals that the other Allies deemed 
acceptable, the Soviet delegation continued to thwart progress toward peace and 
reconstruction.  Despite the USSR’s post-war European and Pacific territorial 
acquisitions, not to mention Stalin’s own assertion that the Soviet Union was in no 
danger of becoming encircled, the Soviet delegation asserted that the US was attempting 
to economically enslaving Europe.  Byrnes was concerned with the “increasing tension 
between us and the Soviet Union,” evidenced by Soviet characterization of states friendly 
to the US as unfriendly to the USSR, and vice-versa, and in promotion of the inevitability 
of armed conflict that Stalin had introduced in his February speech.90   
While the Peace Conference was underway, the Soviet Union again 
asserted itself in the Middle East.  In August, Stalin demanded that Turkey allow the 
Soviets to share control of the Black Sea Straits.  The US viewed that as a way to 
dominate Turkey, which had been overhauling its military and developing its economy.   
With Communism still looming in neighboring Greece, where it was believed that the 
Soviets were providing support, the US encouraged the Turks to decline the Soviet 
demand and followed that with a show of force, sending an aircraft carrier through the 
waterway.91  Once again, the Soviet Union “backed down” from its overtures.92  
Shortly thereafter, the communist influence continued to spread through 
Europe.  In September, the Bulgarian monarchy was abolished in favor of a people’s 
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republic by a national referendum,93 and Bulgarian Communists won sixty percent of the 
National Assembly seats, with an additional nineteen percent going to their political 
coalition partners in an October election.  The next month, as the CFM met at New York, 
Stalinist Georgi Dimitrov was elected Prime Minister of Bulgaria.94  As well, Romania’s 
“obviously rigged election”95 produced a communist-led coalition government there, 
with a communist majority winning nearly eighty-five percent of parliamentary seats.  
King Michael followed this in early December with a royal declaration of “Soviet-
oriented foreign policy.”96  The next week, the CFM, incorporating recommendations 
from other parties at the Paris Peace Conference, finally completed treaties for peace with 
Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.97  At the end of the month in Hungary, 
politicians from non-communist parties, who had not yet been removed from their posts, 
were arrested.4-43 
c. 1947 
Clearly, the situation had shifted from one of Allies coordinating war 
efforts against the axis powers to one in which the Soviet Union apparently placed its 
own interests above those of the West, although such was plainly to have been predicted 
by the skeptics in 1942, and was, in fact, by Hitler and Goebbels – they were now quite 
departed from the scene..  While Western European nations drew down their military 
forces from wartime strength and focused on recovery, non-European Allies redeployed 
or demobilized their forces.  The Soviet Union, however, maintained its troop strength 
and high production of its armament industry, despite the war’s end.  Internal and 
external strains among the wartime Allies ebbed and flowed as they worked to put World 
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War II to rest.  As the Soviets consolidated their war spoils of territorial gains and 
influence, and in doing so drawing that Iron Curtain across Europe, those countries 
behind it were turning away from the West, either by choice or coercion, and becoming 
politically, economically, and militarily obligated to one another.  Between 1943 and 
1949, over twenty agreements were signed among the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European people’s democracies,98 and this period marked the decline and end of 
discussions between Western European powers and the Soviet Union as allies regarding 
World War II.   
Nineteen forty-seven was a pivotal year in the effort to lay the war to rest 
and build a secure and economically stable future.  In contrast to the diplomatic success 
achieved at the end of 1946 that enabled conclusion of peace issues for many European 
countries, fundamental differences on the issues that remained would ultimately cause it 
to fail as an Allied process.  Suspicions of the USSR and the West strengthened between 
them, and the two would move closer to the bi-polar balance of power in Europe that 
existed until the end of the Twentieth Century.  Western European leaders had to face the 
reality of Soviet Communist expansion, and they had to deal with it.  As had been 
happening in the East, interstate agreements were initiated among the Western Allies to 
provide military and economic security, making those states interdependent upon one 
another as they pursued their common interests. In the end, the Iron Curtain drawn 
between the eastern and western wartime Allies would tighten and close, with the USSR 
on one side and the western powers on the other.   
(1) The Truman Doctrine.  As had the previous year, 1947 
began with broadening communist domination over another European country as voters 
in Poland elected a Communist-dominated coalition to power in Parliament.99  In Greece, 
where Britain has been supporting the government fight against communist forces, the 
Nationalist Army and economy were in shambles as a result of the civil war.  In January, 
Truman offered economic and advisory support to Greek Nationalists in their fight, and 
on 18 February he received a report that the communists were making a move toward 
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victory.  Three days later the British ambassador to the US announced that his country 
would be unable to continue providing assistance to Greece and Turkey beyond March.  
With the end of British economic aid to Greece and Turkey, Greece would be vulnerable 
to the Soviet-sponsored Communist expansion, with Turkey next in line.  Undersecretary 
of State Acheson anticipated that Greece would fall to the communists, and that the 
Soviets would exploit the situation to pursue goals in the Straits that had been thwarted 
the previous year.  He described the “domino theory,” that countries neighboring 
communist states would subsequently fall to communism, and expressed specific concern 
about France, Germany, and Italy.100 
In response, on March 12 Truman articulated his view against such 
aggression, the “Truman Doctrine,” in a speech delivered to Congress, declaring “the 
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,”101 and that “wherever and 
whenever an anti-Communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, 
foreign invasion, or even diplomatic pressure, the United States would supply political, 
economic, and … military aid.”102  He then asked Congress to provide funds and 
assistance to Greece and Turkey,103 thus picking up the support to those countries that 
Britain could no longer provide, and this request was approved on 22 May.   
(2) The Marshall Plan.  General George Marshall had resigned 
from the US Army and was appointed Secretary of State upon Byrnes’ resignation in 
January of 1947.  He recognized that the present level of emergency aid to European 
states would not be enough to enable their recovery.  Two months after the ‘Truman 
Doctrine’ was announced, Marshall made a speech in June of 1947 regarding the 
European economic situation and proposed that European states could collectively define 
their requirements and develop a program reconstruction, instead of each state rebuilding 
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its economy individually.104  The “Marshall Plan” was available to every European 
country, and it was eagerly welcomed by most European states as a means to rebuild 
Europe in a manner that would alleviate economic tensions between countries that had 
led to wars in the past.  Stalin was initially open to the idea and the Soviet Union attended 
the Paris meeting to discuss the proposal.  After the Soviet ambassador to the US advised 
him that the plan was an American tool to form a “West European bloc,” Stalin decided 
not to participate.105  After a few days of discussions, representatives of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia agreed to reject the plan106 and Molotov walked out of the conference, 
essentially marking the end of East-West cooperation on European recovery.   
After the Soviet Union’s denouncement of the Marshall Plan, 
“Russia retained her grip on East Europe; indeed, she strengthened it.”107  Following 
Molotov’s departure, Stalin accused “the Western powers of seeking to divide Europe 
into two hostile camps,”108 and directed countries within the Soviet sphere not to 
participate in it.  Czechoslovakia and Poland had already announced their intentions to 
attend a subsequent meeting in July to draft details for implementing the Marshall Plan.  
Poland quickly withdrew its acceptance of the invitation, but Czechoslovakia did not 
follow Stalin’s directive quickly enough.  Calling Polish and Czech leaders to Moscow, 
he directed that “there would be no East European participation in the Marshall Plan, or 
in any other American scheme for the rehabilitation of Europe.”109  Upon his return from 
Moscow, “Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk commented bitterly, ‘I went to Moscow 
as the Foreign Minister of an independent sovereign state, … I returned as a lackey of the 
Soviet Government.’”110  The rest of the year, and much of 1948, would be characterized 
by the entrenchment of Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe.  The Soviet Union 
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continued to widen its presence, further violating agreements by rearming some of its 
new territories in Eastern Europe, and was flexing its authority on the UN Security 
Council in its own interests.111 
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III. HOW NATO WAS FORMED 
It was against this backdrop that militarily weak Western leaders borrowed a 
concept from Marshall’s plan for economic recovery and decided that they should 
develop a security program from a “joint and combined” perspective.  Britain and France 
had signed a treaty at Dunkirk in March of 1947 to stave off any renewed German 
aggression, which was seen by many thinkers about the future of Europe as the most 
likely threat to peace in a decade’s time, as had been the case in the period from 1919 
until the early 1930s.  This policy was seen by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin as 
an example of treaties that should be utilized throughout Western Europe to unify its 
states into one body, with the support of non-European allies.  This idea would gain favor 
on both sides of the Atlantic, and become the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty.  
Supporters, however, needed to overcome the reluctance of the isolationist sentiment in 
the United States that had made it a late entrant into both World Wars, as well as the 
recent internationalism of those who put their faith in the United Nations. 
A. THE BRUSSELS TREATY 
Notions for an alliance in the West had been made since before the war’s end, 
when “Norwegian … Trygve Lie had pressed for an Atlantic alliance.”112  In his “Iron 
Curtain” speech, Churchill proposed that “if the population of the English-speaking 
Commonwealth be added to that of the United States, with all that such cooperation 
implies … there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.”113  In a speech at the 
UN in September of 1947, Canadian Louis St. Laurent “suggested … ‘an association of 
democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international 
obligations in return for a greater measure of national security.’”114  When the Soviets 
walked out of CFM discussions in December, Bevin proposed to Marshall “‘the 
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formation of some sort of union … in Western Europe backed by the United States and 
the Dominions.’”115  Other European states agreed, with Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak 
arguing “that any defense arrangements which did not include the United States were 
without practical value.  The Dutch favored the same line.”116 
Marshall, aware of the differing domestic views in the United States that would 
come into play, was noncommittal, but Bevin was not dissuaded.  He made his plans to 
arrange such an alliance with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg public in a 
speech to the House of Commons in January, and negotiations began early March.  Bevin 
continued to engage the North Americans, and sent three versions of arrangements that 
would broaden the developing alliance to Canada and the US on 11 March.  They were 
received warmly, and Bevin recommended beginning discussions on them at the earliest 
opportunity.  The Treaty of Brussels, which required all parties to lend all available 
assistance any of them that was subject to an armed attack, was signed on 17 March. 117 
B. SECRET ATLANTIC NEGOTIATIONS 
The day the Brussels Treaty was signed, Truman addressed Congress, expressing 
his confidence that the “determination of the free countries of Europe to protect 
themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect 
themselves.”118  Eight days later, the United States informed Britain that “We are 
prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic 
security system,”119 and Britain moved quickly.  From 22 March to 1 April, delegations 
from Britain and Canada secretly met with US State and War Department officials at the 
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Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., to explore options for an alliance including the 
Brussels Powers, Canada, and the US, and how to achieve it.  The US viewed the 
Brussels Treaty as “too narrow to join,” and determined that “a larger ‘Atlantic’ 
organization would have to be devised to protect other countries in danger of Communist 
subversion or attack.”120  The first stage resulted in agreement to form a new “Western 
Mutual Defense Pact” and a draft joint paper with recommendations for fulfilling 
Truman’s declaration. 
After six days of consultation with their governments, the delegations reconvened 
for second round of meetings to determine what items that the treaty forming the alliance 
should include, and created a draft called the Pentagon Paper.  In the days that followed, 
they covered four topics: the mutual assistance pledge; indirect aggression; the territorial 
scope; and membership.  It was agreed that members of the alliance would determine for 
themselves whether an armed attack occurred, and would take the steps it deemed 
necessary to address it.  They also agreed that a party that felt its territorial integrity or 
independence was compromised by armed or indirect force would consult with its allies, 
and that the treaty would apply to Europe, North America, and North Atlantic islands.  
Invitations for membership would be extended to “Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, 
and Ireland … Portugal … Italy,” and that Switzerland would be informally advised that 
it could join.  In addition, there was a strictly secret agreement that provided for West 
German and West Austrian membership.  Consensus on the recommendations reached in 
these negotiations was formalized in the Pentagon Paper on 1 April, and a timeline was 
drafted to implement them.121  Open negotiations with all prospective parties, however, 
would have to wait until differing views of U.S. foreign policy were overcome through a 
process that merged “the old internationalism and the nationalism which had formed such 
a strong part of the isolationist tradition.”122 
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C. THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION 
That isolationism was steeped in a US “tradition of political and military non-
entanglement with Europe that stretched back to the termination of the Franco-American 
alliance of 1778.”123  Formally breaking away from that tradition, despite which it had 
entered into both World Wars, the United States committed itself to develop and 
associate itself with regional and collective-security agreements, and to the maintenance 
of peace when the Senate approved the Vandenberg Resolution in April.124  Senator 
Vandenberg was the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and he was a former 
isolationist who converted to internationalism and, viewing a military alliance as a return 
to the failed balance of power system, placed his hopes in the UN, even though he knew 
the USSR’s ability to cast a veto on the Security Council frustrated “hopes of creating a 
genuine collective security for the world.”125 
Internationalists did not approve of the “European eagerness for military aid,” and 
the Senate was committed to retain the constitutional role to declare war.  Aware of 
Internationalist views regarding the UN and foreign aid and the UN, the North Atlantic 
Treaty authors cited the UN Charter in most articles and included the principle of self-
help that charged members with maintaining their ability to defend themselves as a 
means to overcome the Internationalist objections.  Equally sensitive to the Isolationist 
sentiment to avoid a requirement contained in the Brussels Treaty for members to commit 
themselves to an ally in case it was attacked, they utilized wording developed by George 
Kennan for Article 5 of the treaty, similar to that of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance  signed at Rio (the Rio Pact) in December of 1947, “that an attack 
against one would be considered and attack against all, but the measures taken by each 
member state would be ‘such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
                                                 
123 Kaplan, 1. 
124 U.S. Senate, Senate Resolution 239. 80th Cong.1948, Art 2-4, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
decade/decad040.htm, accessed May 2006. 
125 Kaplan, 4. 
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force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’” to satisfy them.126  
Using much of the same language and reinforcing the American governmental 
procedures, Senator Vandenberg drafted a resolution establishing policy for the US to 
pursue international security and peace via conditions found in the North Atlantic Treaty, 
which passed a Senate vote in June, signaling “American acceptance of the 
entanglement.”127  The passing of “the Vandenberg Resolution cleared away most of the 
obstacles to ultimate acceptance of an American military alliance with Western 
Europe.”128 
D. FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS 
On 6 July, formal negations for an Atlantic alliance convened at Washington with 
Canada, the Brussels Powers, and the US.129  Language delineating US actions in case of 
an attack continued to be debated, as did the list of potential members.  In September, 
results of the negotiations were contained in the Washington paper, which included 
verbiage that drew from both the Rio Pact and Brussels Treaty.130  The Washington paper 
also recommended that the treaty would exist within the construct of the United Nations 
treaty, recognizing and reinforcing the primacy of that organization; that it would define 
its effective area; that it would be more than simply military, in that it would promote 
welfare of the people in the member countries; and that it would have a mechanism for 
implementation.  In October, Canada and all Brussels Powers agreed to join, and the 
work on drafting the treaty commenced on 10 December.  On 10 March of 1949, 
Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy were formally invited to join in the 
alliance.  All accepted, and NATO was formed on 4 April, as the North Atlantic Treaty 
was signed at Washington.131 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
NATO was formed in response to a perception by the Western Allies that the 
menace of Soviet Communism was encroaching from the east, even before the end of the 
war.  In countries where the Red Army pushed Nazi forces out of Eastern Europe, 
Communist governments took root.  As the postwar peace process advanced from 1945 to 
1947, the Soviet Union’s interpretation of international agreements, its prioritization of 
issues, and its overall objectives for the future seemed to differ distinctly from those of 
her Allies.  These differences or misunderstandings between East and West stalled the 
peace process repeatedly, fomented mutual mistrust, and enhanced the Western view of 
the Soviets as a threat. 
A. LESSONS 
The lessons to be drawn from NATO’s history are numerous.  Of primary 
importance are in the realms of consultation among democracies, threat perception and 
economy as it relates to security.   
1. Consultation 
First, members of the World War II Alliance consulted with one another 
throughout the war to share views and rationales regarding their interests during and after 
the war.  After the war, this continued via the peace process, allowing the USSR to 
determine that its goals were unlikely to be attained through further cooperation with the 
West, and the other members gained an understanding of the Soviet Union, in that it 
placed self-interest above those of Europe as a whole.  Upon the Soviet departure from 
the peace process, and earlier rejection of the invitation to participate in the European 
Reconstruction Plan, western uncertainty of the USSR increased to such a degree that the 
USSR was seen as a threat.  As an alliance, NATO reduces its members’ uncertainty.  
Internally, it does so by clarifying national goals for other members in a manner that does 
not raise suspicions or the specter of war among the others.  The consultative nature of 
the alliance permits members to understand each others’ views and rationales on issues 
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vital to defense, and enables solutions to national problems to be developed collectively, 
and in a manner that maintains peace, rather than one that jeopardizes it. 
Through the process of enlargement, NATO initially broadened its security 
umbrella to include West Germany, then farther south and east, over many former 
satellite states of the USSR.  In doing so, NATO has increased the security of all 
members by expanding the number of states, and size of the area, that are committed to 
its principles.  This has increased both the alliance’s information-sharing among all of 
them and the aggregate size of military forces available to defend them.  With those 
forces under the civilian control of democratic governments, the potential for domestic 
instability, and, subsequently, regional uncertainty and insecurity are even further 
reduced. 
2. Threat Perception  
The second lesson is in regards to threat perception.  The likelihood of Soviet 
expansion into Western Europe is questionable, but the perception of it as a threat by 
Western European states is understandable.  Stalin and his representatives had continually 
provided two, seemingly contradictory, messages regarding the governments of states 
along its borders.  Initially, during negotiations with the British in 1941, the Soviets 
expressed security as a primary interest, and declared that it wanted only friendly 
governments on its borders to prevent another invasion from the west.  In September that 
year, the Soviet ambassador in London pledged to defend nations’ rights to 
independence, sovereignty, and governmental self-determination as he announced Soviet 
agreement with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.  During the Yalta Conference in 
1945, Stalin himself agreed with Churchill and Roosevelt that sovereignty and self-
determination would be restored to nations overtaken by the Axis.  Later in the year, at 
Potsdam, Stalin further agreed that postwar peace would be made with democratic 
governments.  While the Soviet requirement for security did not necessarily contradict its 
dedication to national sovereignty and self-determination in states formerly subjected to 
the Axis, the spread of Soviet communism into Eastern European states after the war, and 
establishment of such friendly governments, indicates security was the higher priority. 
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In addition, at Potsdam Stalin also expressed interest in control of the Black Sea 
Straits.  Soviet actions in Iran in late 1945 and toward Turkey in 1946 were addressed by 
the West outside the purview of the CFM.  These were a better reflection of the USSR’s 
unique interests of security and economy than they were of the verbal and written 
agreements made earlier.  With the expansion of communism in Eastern Europe, along 
with the difficulties that the western Allies experienced with the Soviets throughout the 
peace process and the competition of communist parties in several western governments, 
the western Allies became gravely concerned that Soviet communism would expand into 
their own states and subject them to the USSR’s growing dominance on the continent.  
As a result, France and Britain allied themselves with the Benelux states to protect 
themselves from that emerging threat with the Brussels Treaty in 1948. 
3. Economy 
The third lesson is of an economic nature.  Military alliance achieved through the 
Brussels Treaty would not be enough to protect those states from the perceived Soviet 
threat.  With economic recovery recognized to be imperative to future peace in Europe, 
and the European Recovery Plan was initiated.  However, soon after it was implemented, 
it became apparent the Marshall Plan alone was not enough to attain the degree of 
economic and military strength required to successfully resist further Soviet expansion 
westward.   Across Europe, national economies that had been ravaged by the war, and the 
military forces that had fought it, had not yet recovered by the time the Brussels Treaty 
was signed.  As they had done economically, the western European states turned to the 
US for military assistance to provide a blanket of security that would allow economic 
initiatives to take root without interference from the east.  With the investment in 
manpower, resources, and lives that the US had already made in fighting the war, the 
tradition of avoiding entangling alliance since 1800, and the establishment of the UN as a 
global body to prevent future wars, many figures in the US government were reluctant to 
become more deeply involved in what they deemed to be European affairs.  However, 
Senator Vandenberg and others were quick enough to recognize the link between security 
in Europe and global peace, and the careful crafting of the North Atlantic Treaty’s 
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verbiage satisfied enough concerns to enable the United States to join with the Brussels 
Treaty members and other states of the Euro-Atlantic region and establish the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which aggression against one was considered aggression 
against all, and the US began providing military aid and collective defense for western 
Europe. 
Throughout World War II, and up to 1947, the Soviet Union and the Western 
Powers made assumptions about the other, failed to validate them, even when the other’s 
actions indicated that the assumptions may be incorrect.  The USSR stated its goals for 
security and insisted on friendly governments at its borders, and took action to achieve 
them.  In response to those actions, the Western Powers would either directly address the 
actions individually, or sit by in bewilderment.  Conversely, the Western Powers were 
focused on economic recovery and insisted on democratic, sovereign governments in 
former Axis states, and the Soviet Union agreed to those conditions, but felt that those 
governments were a compromise to its security.  Both agreed to the others’ conditions in 
the wartime conferences, and both appear to have been surprised or upset as the tried to 
establish those conditions.  It appears that the Western Powers were unwilling to allow 
another Munich and grant the Soviets a consensual security zone, while the Soviets 
recognized that they were not strong enough, military or otherwise, to pursue their goals 
transparently and then stand their ground.  By 1947, the Allied Powers were no longer 
allies.  They had come together to defeat a common enemy and, once that had been done, 
it is understandable that they would return pursuing their own interests, which had taken 
on a higher priority with the Axis defeat. 
B. THEORY 
By understanding the rich context in which NATO was formed, we can better 
understand the theories of international politics.  The Soviet Union generally exhibited 
Political Realist qualities of security interest by having a buffer zone between itself and 
the west, seeking power and pursuing an imperialist goal to regain its 1941 borders.  The 
Western Allies initially were more in line with Political Idealism, both by establishing the 
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UN to maintain peace and expecting to coexist with the Soviet Union, and by expecting 
newly formed democratic governments to exist peacefully at its borders. 
The states that formed NATO certainly support Keohane’s Neoliberal 
Institutionalism assertion regarding state capabilities.  Instead of preventing states from 
making progress NATO is based upon mutual assistance.  In providing aid to others, 
states that did so enabled gains of others, and at a significant cost to themselves, lowering 
any relative capability advantage they had.  NATO member states saw themselves as the 
actors within the system, and certainly shared mutual interests.  None of them wanted 
another war, and they all wanted stability that would enable Western Europe to recover 
economically and be able to defend itself against a potential Soviet attack.  Through 
cooperation, they gained security and minimized some costs – the Western European 
states would not have to financially and militarily fund their security all on their own, and 
North American states reduced their costs associated with war.  All acted rationally, and 
maximized the benefits associated with peace in Europe, while minimizing both the risk 
that war would occur by balancing collectively against the power of the Soviet Union, 
and the costs to each of them, should such a war occur. 
C. NATO – THE INSTITUTION 
To be sure, NATO is a formal and exclusive institution.  That is, it has established 
an organization of its own, with its own rules, procedures, and customs that demand a full 
understanding.  In the years immediately following the war, from 1945 to 1947, the 
Soviet policy of Communist expansion into Eastern Europe was viewed by statesmen in 
the West as an imminent, unlimited, and unchecked threat.  The Western European states, 
which were economically and militarily incapable of defense, sought some remedy in an 
enduring alliance structure.  The raison d’etre for NATO was that the prospective 
members realized they would be more capable of defending themselves collectively, 
rather than individually, and, while individual members had unique interests, the costs 
involved in such collective defense were outweighed by that benefit for North American, 
North Atlantic, and Western European parties could accrue in a combined, joint effort.  
The North Atlantic Treaty was drafted in the favorable climate among its members, the 
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core of which were Allies during World War II, and all of which opposed the spread of 
communism into Western Europe. 
Initially, NATO’s organizational structure was meager, as European members 
were focused on individual interests of economic and military recovery while relying 
upon their transatlantic allies to aid them in case of attack.  The outbreak of the Korean 
War in June of 1950 was the catalyst that compelled the European members to rapidly 
invest militarily and economically in the alliance.  In doing so, NATO absorbed some of 
the institutional bodies of the Western Union Defense Organization that had been formed 
by the Brussels Pact in 1948, a year prior to the North Atlantic Treaty at Washington.  To 
this foundation, the allies added structure, facilities, and mechanisms that increased the 
capability and enhanced the efficiency of the alliance over time, so that the western bloc 
of North Atlantic allies came to form a counterweight for Soviet power in Europe.  With 
the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Soviet threat against which the NATO was formed 
dissolved, but NATO had never been merely an issue solely of the Soviet threat to the 
West.  It had also been about the question of collective defense and collective security in 
Europe generally.  Thus, the alliance lives on, in an altered form, having adapted itself to 
the needs of the post-Cold War at the end of the 20th century in ways that alliance hands 
would have poorly anticipated twenty-five years ago.   By assisting former adversaries to 
develop their own capabilities as it continued to enlarge its membership, NATO has taken 
on an exogenous character, to a degree, since 1989. 
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